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He had hit upon the paradox of excessive order, the
perfection of which inevitably brought inaction in its
train.... For some indefinable reason, order seems to
bring on bloodshed!
-Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities'
INTRODUCTION
Globalization is commonly thought to constitute a challenge to
the state-a common trope of the discipline is to speak of post-
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Westphalianism (whatever that is) and of sovereignty under siege.2 But
whatever the effects of the global on states' internal processes and
interactions,3  the formal bordering of states-their territorial
delimitation-remains extraordinarily rigid, with other shifts in legal
authority, social and economic power, and the distribution of rights
playing out within this largely unchanging frame. If borders matter-and
of course they do, in new ways and ways they long have 4-- then states
matter.
This rigidity is two-fold: one part, a conceptual and doctrinal
stasis-since the Second World War, legal norms have consistently
2 See, e.g., Richard Falk, Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia, 6 J. ETHICS 311,
345 (2002) (discussing the "sequel to Westphalia"); A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the
Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27
REV. INT'L STUD. 133, 133 (2001) (criticizing "Westphalian-inspired notions of state-centricity,
positivist international law, and 'public' definitions of authority [as] incapable of capturing the
significance of non-state actors..., informal normative structures, and private, economic power
in the global political economy.").
For a skeptical view, see Timothy William Waters, "The Momentous Gravity of the State of
Things Now Obtaining": Annoying Westphalian Objections to the Idea of Global Governance,
16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25 (2009).
See, e.g., Ashifa Kassam, Morocco destroys migrant camps near border with Spanish enclave,
THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 11, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/ll/morocco-
destroys-migrant-camps-melilla-spain-border (describing efforts to control illegal crossings of
the elaborate border fences between Morocco and Spanish Melilla); Michael Holtz,
Mediterranean migrant deaths show limits of EU rescue efforts (+video), CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 11, 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/021 1/Mediterranean-
migrant-deaths-show-limits-of-EU-rescue-efforts-video (describing efforts to control illegal
maritime migration into the European Union); David D. Kirkpatrick, Before Dangers at Sea,
African vfigrants Face Perils of a Lawless Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/world/africa/libya-migrants-
mediterranean.html?emc=edit th 20150428&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=26819809# (noting both
the effects of a collapsed state in Libya on immigration into Europe and the continued difficulties
of migration); Patrick Kingsley, Matthew Weaver & Ashifa Kassam, Sweden Introduces Border
Checks as Refugee Crisis Grows, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 12, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/1 2/refugee-crisis-sweden-introduces-border-checks
(last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (discussing reimposition of border controls in response to the
European refugee crisis). Yet even those subversions suggest the continued importance of states
as governed territorial communities: Illegal migrants are trying to get from one state to another,
often risking death in the attempt. Likewise, life within a given state is not monolithic; much of
life goes on outside of processes determined by the state. But in many parts of the world, it
matters greatly to the contours of that society which state is establishing the rules and enforcing
them: Whether one has the right to work in the formal economy, what social benefits and
resources one has, and many other things are functions of decisions made by states, whose
authority most often runs most strongly on their own territory. See, e.g., Griselda Nevarez,
Undocumented Immigrants Face Limited Health Care Options, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 28,
2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/28/undocumented-immigrants-health-
caren 4679348.html (noting legal limits on government benefits to non-citizens illegally in the
United States).
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reinforced a regime of inviolable frontiers-and the other, perhaps in
consequence, an unchanging list of states. It might not seem that way,
given the explosion in the number of states since the Second World War;
after all, the original membership of the United Nations was fifty-one,
and now is up to 193.' But most of these new states were former
colonies, and are conventionally understood as a special case, a kind of
one-off; and after independence these new states followed the general
rule, keeping their colonial borders. Meanwhile, when truly new units
have appeared-mostly from the post-Cold War dissolutions of the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia-politics and scholarship have emphasized
internal legal provisions allowing secession and promoted existing
internal boundaries as defaults for new frontiers.6 The result has been, in
historical perspective, an era of minimal border changes, with doctrines
to back that up.
There has also been, on some accounts, a decline in violent
conflict, which was the point. The express purpose of the legal regime
put in place at the end of the Second World War-territorial integrity,
self-determination, and the prohibition of aggressive war and conquest-
was to stabilize global politics and reduce the resort to war.7 Rigid
borders were an intentional part of that project.
But has that been the result? Have fixed borders produced a
more peaceful world? How are territorial inviolability's effects to be
measured? Even if we accept that on historical trends, borders have been
unusually stable and that violence has declined-which is far from
clear-to what should we ascribe these effects? What is the proper
framework for measuring the relative or absolute performance of this
See Member States: Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
6 See, e.g., HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 45-49 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, Revised 1996) (discussing limits to acceptance of self-determination outside the colonial
context); Steven Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 590 (1996) (discussing critically the conversion of internal boundaries into
international frontiers). See also Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International
Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE
IT 238 (1994) (discussing the purposes of the Charter system "intended to allow states to avoid
unilateral reliance on the military instrument to guarantee their own security."). On norms of
aggression and conquest, see SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION
OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 179 (1996). On legal
standards for aggression and territorial integrity, see Timothy William Waters, Plucky Little
Russia: Misreading the Georgian War through the Distorting Lens of Aggression, 49 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 176, 193 (2013).
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central tenet of the global order? This paper is part of a broader project
on territorial integrity and self-determination, but focuses on the
epistemological problem: How do we know if the current rule is working
or not?
I. THE CONTOURS OF THE PRESENT RULE
To begin, we ought to know what the rule is whose effects we
wish to test. Space is short, so I will not discuss the quite fascinating
question of how we arrived at the present global rule-the changing
norms about states' territorial sovereignty and their right to use force; the
history of self-determination as a philosophical ideal for individuals and
then a political ideal for nations; Woodrow Wilson's proposals, which
described a model to change rather than preserve borders; the absorption
of that norm, in radically altered form, into the new global regime after
the Second World War-but instead describe the rule we have, and the
point we have long been at.
The Present Rule-A Regime of Fixed Borders
1. The international system is structured around norms of territorial
integrity. These norms are expressed as formal, legal rules, but
also closely reflect political practice.
2. Existing states may alter their own borders voluntarily-through
cession of territory, merger, or secession.
a. In so doing they may have to take into account the interests of
the affected population.
3. But existing states have a nearly ironclad guarantee of their
territorial integrity-their borders are protected against unwanted
alteration, from without or within, in almost all circumstances.
a. Unilateral secession is not prohibited, but is strongly
disfavored in practice.
4. Self-determination gives the populations of existing territories a
right to self-governance: non-self-governing territories can
become independent, at which point they have the same
protections as existing states.
8 See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATJON OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 11-36,
(1995); On the philosophical development of the concept and its relationship to nationalism, see
ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM (4th ed. 1992).
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5. Increasingly, self-determination includes a right to internal
democratic governance, but only for the totality of the existing
unit. Sub-groups enjoy self-determination as part of the whole
population.
6. The only bases for creating a new state against the will of the
existing state are:
a. remedial secession, on two possible grounds:
i. gross violations of a minority's human rights; such as
genocide;
ii. systematic exclusion of some group on invidious grounds
from participation in the whole territory's self-governance;
b. or, total dissolution of the state:
i. but the successor states will, if at all possible, be drawn
from existing territorial sub-units, rather than newly
identified peoples as such.
7. Law and politics tend to analyze the division of a state as
voluntary or the product of dissolution, rather than unilateral
secession.
8. Groups as such have no right to form new states; law and politics
are markedly suspicious of ethnically based claims to create new
states.
That is the present rule, without the footnotes, of course, but a
description with which most observers might plausibly agree.' To which
we could add, as mentioned above, that the purpose of the rule-the
thing we believe, or rather assume, that it does-is to stabilize politics
and reduce violence. We ought to test this proposition. The question is,
how?
Here are some sources from which this account draws, and which I think would not disagree
with this part (though some surely would with the rest of my argument): Lea Brilmayer,
Secession and SeIf-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991 )
(laying out the orthodox view of self-determination law with an eye to critiquing its basic
assumption of a conflict between self-determination and territorial integrity); Patrick Thomberry,
Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 INT'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 867 (1989) (reviewing the state of the law prior to the outbreak of the Yugoslav
conflict); HANNUM, supra note 6; MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993); SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert McCorquodale
ed., 2000); THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION AND STATE IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2002); Orentlicher, supra note 6;
Steven Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 590 (1996).
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II. SOMETHING WE CAN'T KNOW: THE PROBLEM OF TESTING A
GLOBAL NORM
Claims about the effects of our territorial ordering rules-
whether in relation to violent conflict or more generally-are empirical
claims, though they don't get far before giving away, and tripping over
their normative underpinnings. But even if we try to stick resolutely to
the empirical basis for the claim that, say, territorial integrity stabilizes
global politics and limits violence, problems arise. How is this claim to
be measured? The regime of territorial integrity is a global rule, and
global rules, by their nature, are not readily amenable to empirical
testing.
The challenges of designing rigorous social scientific
experiments are always considerable-the endemic problems with
incomplete data, with selecting and coding variables and the like. But
empirical analysis confronts special problems in the realms of
international law, international relations, and comparative international
politics quite simply because the available data is so thin.1" Even the
most comprehensive studies have an n that would be disturbingly small
in many harder sciences, because the N of all states is very small (the
population of states is approximately 193)." And the data points in that
population-which include Russia and San Marino, Indonesia and
Paraguay, Norway and Somalia--are shockingly dissimilar when
compared to the white mice of scientific lore, 2 or even the subjects of
10 John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, Leaving theory behind. Why simplistic hypothesis
testing is bad for International Relations, 19 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 427, 429 (2013) (critiquing the
use in international relations of (in particular) quantitative analysis without adequate theory, and
noting the "inherent complexity and diversity of the international system and the problematic
nature of much of the available data."); Id. at 442 ("Lastly, hypothesis testing in IR is
constrained when dealing with phenomena where the universe of cases is small or even non-
existent, as in the case of social revolution or nuclear war. Standard statistical methods will not
work in these situations... forcing scholars to rely on theory, qualitative methods, or other
techniques for studying rare events. . . . Trying to solve this problem by simply increasing the
number of observations. . . 'may push scholars to compare cases that are not analytically
equivalent' (citing RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 11
(H.E. Brady & D. Collier, eds., 2004)).
This can create the apparently happy circumstance that state-level studies can have a relatively
large n (sample size)--relative to the N of all states, that is. Even a sample equal to the entire
population is so small that a considerable amount of random variation would be expected, of the
kind that smoothes out in samples from much larger populations. See, e.g., Concept Stew,
Statistics for the Terrified. The importance of n (sample size) in statistics,
http://www.conceptstew.co.uk/pages/nsamplesize.htmi (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
12 Or scientific practice: see Remy Melina, Why Do Medical Researchers Use Mice?,
LIVESCIENCE, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.livescience.eom/32860-why-do-medical-researchers-
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social scientific studies focused on human, rather than international,
interactions.' 3 Cross-state comparisons can be particularly fraught-
many a graduate student (and professor) has produced a multi-country
case study or a two-by-two graph of questionable value-because the
problem of controlling for variation between the cases consumes the
entire enterprise, or should. 4
Still, unless one is ultimately skeptical about empirical
techniques (as I am not), one must admit that they are or can be useful
for international relations and law'-and to be sure, there are many
aspects of the international system, the differing effects of which one
might profitably study in a rigorous, empirical manner.'6 Indeed,
international relations as a field has moved decisively in the direction of
empirical, specifically quantitative and statistical, analysis, 7 and law has
use-mice.html (noting "Most of the mice and rats used in medical trials are inbred so that, other
than sex differences, they are almost identical genetically. This helps make the results of medical
trials more uniform..."); Find and Order Mice, THE JACKSON LABORATORY,
https://www.jax.org/jax-mice-and-services/find-and-order-jax-mice and subordinate pages (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015) (describing strains of mice available for research).
13 What counts as a large-N or large-n study in international relations would be quite small in other
disciplines. By comparison, the original iteration of the famous and enormously productive
Nurses' Health Studies surveyed 121,000 participants-all female, married, between the ages of
30 and 55, and living in I I U.S. states. Cf The Nurses' Health Study: History - Nurses' Health
Study (original cohort), http://www.channing.harvard.edu/nhs/?page id=70 (last visited Oct. 30,
2015).
14 Cf. Mearsheimer & Walt, supra note 10, at 446-47 ("Generating novel results is easy, however,
when the relevant variables are defined in different ways, data quality is poor, and the
hypotheses being tested are loosely tied to theory.... [T]hese problems typify much of the
hypothesis testing that takes place in IR. Under these conditions, regression coefficients 'can
bounce around like a box of gerbils on methamphetamines. This is great for generating large
bodies of statistical literature ... but not so great at ever coming to a conclusion'.") (ellipsis in
internal citation original, citing Philip A. Schrodt, Beyond the Linear Frequentist Orthodoxy, 14
POL. ANALYSIS 335, 337 (2006)).
'5 See GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994) (one of the standard texts for the
field); Will H. Moore, Synthesis vs. Purity and Large-N Studies: How Might We Assess the Gap
between Promise and Performance?, 6 HUMAN RTS. & WELFARE 88 (2006) (reviewing TODD
LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2005)).
16 See, e.g., THE CORRELATES OF WAR PROJECT, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2015) (including a variety of datasets on use of military force since the early 19th century);
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ (last visited
Oct. 30, 2015) (including data on all constitutions promulgated since 1789, and noting that the
database covers 2,224 "constitutional events"); International Relations and Human Rights Data,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/research/databases/international-
relations.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (providing links to a variety of datasets for research on
issues pertaining to international relations).
" Mearsheimer & Walt, supra note 10 (discussing and criticizing this development).
Wisconsin International Law Journal
increasingly embraced empirical, social scientific approaches, yielding
insights of great value.
So in despairing of the testability of the current territorial
integrity rule, I am not proposing Luddite resistance to statistics, nor
sophomoric insistence on levels of certainty about causality that even the
most rigorous sciences do not technically achieve. An experiment
replicated 10,000 times with the whitest of mice does not actually
guarantee the result of the 10,001st, but we understand that, within that
philosophical limit on our certainty, we can speak with pragmatic
confidence about predictable relationships. Causality is a deep
philosophical problem, and proving it is an epistemological challenge,
but we can and should accept the practical value of thinking about it and
embracing our best approximations: Tomorrow morning you will
intuitively glance eastward to find the rising sun, and you will not be
disappointed.
But here we deal with something different: a special objection to
the possibility that we might achieve even the usual level of pragmatic
confidence. Territorial integrity is not the type of rule we can subject to a
scientific experiment in which we may replicate results and control the
environment, because the rule encompasses the operations of the entire
system. The territorial integrity regime is not a rare event about which
we have only a little data; it is an all-pervasive factor, whose
omnipresence makes it difficult to construct conditions in which it varies.
It is an invariable: a global condition for which we lack an adequate
control.
Even here, we require a qualification: certain types of global rule
may be amenable to measurement. A rule, say, that introduces a very
discrete change into the system at a specific time, leaving other elements
of the system in place, might allow one to conduct a longitudinal
analysis, with the prior conditions as a quasi-control and the change a
treatment whose effect we can measure. But while territorial integrity
fulfills part of this scenario-its origins can be traced to a quite discrete
date in history-it doesn't match other critical elements. After all, that
date, 1945, was quite a year, with all kinds of things going on: the end of
an unprecedentedly large, violent, all-encompassing conflict; the
comprehensive realignment of global politics in the crystallizing Cold
War; the introduction of atomic weapons; the creation of the UN; the
beginning of the colonial system's collapse. These many moving parts-
some closely linked to the new territorial norms, others not-make it
quite difficult to design some longitudinal study with "pre-1945 levels of
Vol. 33, No. 3 Testing the Norm of Territorial Integrity
violence" as a baseline, territorial integrity as an independent variable,
and "post-1945 levels of violence" as the dependent variable. I don't
think the regression exists that could hold the other factors constant.
Similarly, we might imagine testable claims about a global norm
gradually or partially applied-the spread of democracy, say, with a
corollary empirical claim about a democratic peace.'" But this too is
different: however universal that norm, precisely because its application
has been piecemeal and partial, we might be able to test its differing
effects. By contrast, the territorial integrity norm has operated at all times
and places since its introduction; it has operated in conditions of peace
and war; even in places where borders have changed, the norm has been
extant, either shaping behavior or not.
All of this makes it difficult (let us admit it, impossible) to say
what in fact the rule has done. We have experienced the border changes
we have, and suffered the wars we have suffered, either despite this rule
or because of it. Or something else: so far as I have been able to find,
despite decades of productive research in international relations and
political science, the current rule turns out to be entirely untested-
unsurprisingly, since we have no second earth on which to try out an
alternative.
So a preliminary consideration, if these observations about the
limits of empirical inquiry into the effects of the territorial integrity
regime are roughly right: if there is in fact some way to measure a global
rule of this kind, it would be good to know what it is. And if not, what
proxies or approximations might we examine? What aspects or incidents
of the present rule, or correlates of it, might we test, if not the rule itself?.
Il. THE LITTLE WE Do KNOW: ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT
RULE
Untestable does not mean inscrutable, and there are aspects of
the current rule we can describe, which may help us consider alternative,
18 John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis
testing is bad for International Relations, 19 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 427, 442 (2013) ("As the well-
known example of the democratic peace hypothesis illustrates, even well-confirmed empirical
regularities do not provide an explanation for why they occur. A robust correlation still leaves us
puzzled if we do not know why it happens and we tend to be skeptical of such findings until a
convincing explanation-in other words, a theory-is given.") and 446 (noting that "this
literature may be a poor model for the field as a whole, because relationships as robust as the
democratic peace are rare").
Wisconsin International Law Journal
indirect ways to evaluate its effects. In particular, if we consider why we
have this rule-what we think it does-we see three groups of
assumptions or predictions:"
1. First, an assumption that fixed borders are stabilizing-
a. and therefore a prediction that a more relaxed regime would
lead to violence and endless fracturing into small, unviable
states.
2. Second, an assumption that the present rule improves politics and
discourse within states-
a. and therefore a prediction that an option of exit would lower
minorities' incentives for cooperation.
3. And third, an assumption that that the present rule provides
support, at least on the margins, for liberal or cosmopolitan forms
of society-
a. and therefore a prediction that a more relaxed rule of secession
would lead to the creation of illiberal and nationalist states.
These assumptions might be summarized under three headings:
I. That territorial integrity promotes stability;
2. that it effectively promotes political processes for reconciling
differences among diverse communities; and
3. that it reflects the value commitments of liberal international
society better than any alternative.
These assumptions include both empirical predictions about how the rule
operates and normative beliefs about how the world properly ought to be.
Within each of these three areas, we might also identify related, more
specific assumptions. So, let us examine each-not to provide definitive
answers, of course, but merely to identify areas in which more rigorous
examination might be profitable, or not.
'9 Id. at 442 ("As the well-known example of the democratic peace hypothesis illustrates, even
well-confirmed empirical regularities do not provide an explanation for why they occur. A robust
correlation still leaves us puzzled if we do not know why it happens and we tend to be skeptical
of such findings until a convincing explanation-in other words, a theory-is given."); Id. at 446
(noting that "this literature may be a poor model for the field as a whole, because relationships as
robust as the democratic peace are rare").
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A. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT STABILITY AND VIOLENCE
Fracture: First, it is supposed that relaxing the rigid commitment
to territorial integrity would lead to destabilizing competition among
communities for control of territory and to cycles of fracturing as each
community carved out its own majority territory, in the course of which
large populations would be displaced in campaigns of ethnic cleansing."
As Woodrow Wilson's own Secretary of State worried, after Wilson
proclaimed his commitment to self-determination:
[the] fixity of national boundaries and of national allegiance, and
political stability would disappear if this principle was uniformly
applied.... What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the
Egyptians, and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed
discontent, disorder and rebellion? Will not the Mohammedans of
Syria and Palestine and possibly of Morocco and Tripoli rely on it?
2
'
Implicit is the assumption that, absent such a rule, this process might
have no end, leading to literally thousands of states-especially as each
of the world's thousands of'potential nations might seek its own state.22
The current rule clearly guards against such fracture by giving each state
a veto on changes to its territory and enforcing a default regime of rigid
frontiers.
But how great is the risk of fracture? There are in fact many
incentives for human communities to voluntarily surrender sovereignty
and integrate. These incentives-seen in things like customs unions,
military alliances, the European Union--don't disappear just because
secession is an option. It is not at all clear that all communities would
abandon the benefits of economies of scale and mutual protection for the
brass ring of sovereignty. 3 Indeed, it is certain that many would not,
20 See, e.g., Radha Kumar, The Troubled History of Partition, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1997).
21 Cassese, supra note 8, at 316 (citing Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations-A Personal
Narrative 96 (1920)).
22 A broader right to self-determination might unleash "a Frankenstein of unrestrained proliferation
and fragmentation." Elmer Plischke, Self-Determination: Reflections on a Legacy, 140 WORLD
AFF. 52 (1977-78). One common basis for nation-formation is language; there are over 7,000
languages, although half of them are spoken by very small numbers of people. See
ETHNOLOGUE, http://www.ethnologue.com/world (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
23 Cf G. Majone, Presentation of Cultural Diversity in a Federal System: The Role of the Regions,
in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA (Mark Tushnet, ed.,
1990). The more accurate formulation would be to ask if elites would grab the ring, because in
practice it will not necessarily be a popular, but elite decision (just as the continuation of an
existing state can be an elite, rather than popular choice). Even so, the question, and calculus, is
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because we actually have some empirical evidence: there are still a
number of non-self-governing territories-almost all small, almost all
islands-that have chosen to remain in that status rather than become
fully independent, because their populations (or elites) perceive the
concrete benefits of not being states. 4
What has proved true for colonial populations with an
unimpeachable right to independence would also logically affect the
thinking of other groups. So, does it follow that a more liberal territorial
integrity norm would actually lead to secession? Certainly in some cases
it would-the option of exit built into the peace deal between Sudan and
the Sudan People's Liberation Army yielded an almost unanimous vote
for the independence of South Sudan, for example 25-but as the recent
case of Scotland demonstrates, populations do not necessarily choose to
exit even when they can. 6 And, as the experience of Quebec suggests,
acknowledging the possibility of secession can actually mitigate
secessionist sentiment. 7
Presumably a more flexible regime would lead to at least some
level of fracturing greater than we currently have. But a concern with
fracture just begs the question: What is wrong with that? Assuming it
effectively the same: Will it benefit elites and their patronage networks to seize independence in
a dangerous world? The answer will not necessarily be yes.
24 See The United Nations and Decolonization, Non-Self-Governing Territories, UNITED NATIONS
www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgovterritories.shtm (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
25 Results for the Referendum of Southern Sudan, SOUTHERN SUDAN REFERENDUM 2011,
http://southemsudan2011.com/ (showing results with just under 99 percent in favor of
secession).
26 Scotland's exercise in considering secession occurred under the same territorial integrity norm
that has governed since the Second World War; it was the United Kingdom's own political
process that allowed the referendum, not any difference in the global norm. See Agreement:
Between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a Referendum on
Independence for Scotland (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0040/00404789.pdf.
Cf David Cameron Signs Historic Deal Granting Scottish Referendum, Prime Minister's Office
(press release), GOV.UK, (Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/david-
cameron-signs-historic-deal-granting-scottish-referendum ("Today's landmark event is
facilitated by a technical measure known as a Section 30, which passes power from Westminster
to Holyrood to legislate on the referendum."). See Timothy William Waters, For Freedom
Alone: Secession after the Scottish Referendum, NATIONALITIES PAPERS (2015), DOI:
10.1080/00905992.2015.1 101434, available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1101434.
27 See Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); Theophilos Argitis &
Frederic Tomesco, Quebec Separatists Trounced as Secession Support Wanes, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS, (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-08/quebec-
separatists-trounced-as-secession-support-wanes (discussing the declining support for the
separatist cause over time). The causal relationship between these events is, of course, difficult to
discern.
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were peaceful, why would fracturing necessarily be a problem? What is
the right number of states? There is, in other words, a normative aspect
embedded within this notionally empirical assumption about fracture:
even if the assumption that fracture would result is right, it is an entirely
separate question how we should feel about that. Perhaps having more
states is a problem: it certainly creates a more complex network of
interactions among states, for example, which increase the challenges of
coordination. But that intuition sits uncomfortably with the nearly three-
fold increase in the number of states since the Second World War: 8 Was
that also a troubling proliferation, a fracturing? We typically think
decolonization was a great thing, so which ones should have remained
colonies? It is an awkward question, and the only answer which avoids
awkwardness requires a Panglossian belief that we have just the right
number of states today-that, by the most amazing chance, we created
just the right number of colonies, and then freed them.
We should note another value judgment implicit in this
assumption-though running opposite of the way one might expect.
Endless fracturing would only happen if populations (or elites) thought
having smaller states was in their interest, even if not in the whole
world's interest. If so, it means that given a chance, human beings would
make more states, not fewer. In deciding that this is a bad, even
dangerous idea, we constrain their preferences and their choices, and we
should be clear about that. We are tying our fellow human beings, and
ourselves, to the mast on one of the 193 ships we have already
constructed for sailing past the hazards of this world. And God help
those passengers for whom the ship itself is the danger.
Non-viability: In a related way, we can observe consistent bias
towards the belief that new states may not be viable, which if true
obviously would contribute to general instability.29 States must be
capable of ensuring their own security and prosperity, as well as
25 List of sovereign states in 1945, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of sovereignstates in 1945 (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) and
List of sovereign states in 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of sovereign states in 2015
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015). See also UNITED NATIONS, supra note 5 (showing the increase from
the original 51 members to 193).
29 See, e.g., Josep Desquens, Europe's Stateless Nations in the Era of Globalization: The Case for
Catalonia's Secession from Spain, BC J. INT'L AFF. (Spring 2003),
http://www.jhubc.itIbcjoumal/articles/desquens.cfm (countering arguments that an independent
Catalonia would not be economically viable); Milica C. Bookman, The Economics of Secession,
in SEPARATISM: DEMOCRACY AND DISINTEGRATION 69, 85ff (Metta Spencer, ed., 1998)
(discussing the economic viability of secessions).
Wisconsin International Law Journal
contributing to general security and welfare; smaller units may find this
more difficult; some will find it impossible. So perhaps fracturing is not
only a problem for coordination among units, but for the new units
themselves, which will prove economically and politically incapable of
functioning.
But it is not clear this risk is real, as there are many small states
today, including breakaway territories (such as the Baltics and Slovenia),
which have done quite well economically. Considering that the average
population of a state is about 36 million but the median about 7.6
million, that there are thirty-eight states with populations under 500,000,
that twelve have populations below 100,000 and the very smallest a
population below 1,000,30 it is hard to argue that any given population is
too small to form a state. Indeed it is as often the case that large units
themselves are dysfunctional-not Slovenia but Yugoslavia, not Katanga
but the Congo.
In addition, there presumably would be some kind of self-
regulating effect, as populations or elites are not likely to attempt
secession unless it was plausibly in their interest to do so. Interestingly, a
common objection to secession is the concern that wealthy regions will
withdraw from the state, which hardly fits with the assumption that the
new units will be unviable.31 Moreover, integrative forces not only limit
the likelihood of fracture, but also its attendant harms: smaller units may
indeed be more viable when they are embedded in larger economic and
security blocs, as the experience of the European Union-which has seen
a resurgence of secessionist sentiment-suggests.32
The value of being embedded in larger structures suggests that
another part of the viability assumption is wrong too: the objection that
globalization makes small states less viable probably has the effect
entirely backwards. In a globalized, interconnected world, it is all the
more possible for small units to prosper-so long as they do not imagine
independence to be autarky, which in historical memory, it almost never
has been anyway. Globalization may make a mockery of any state's
30 Countries of the World, WORLD ATLAS,
http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/populations/ctypopls.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); Matt
Rosenberg, The Average Country, ABOUT.COM,
http://geography.about.com/od/lists/a/averagecountry.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
31 Indeed, if anything, the more serious concern would be that the remainder state might be.
32 The intuition that the European Union's structures make secession less costly is widely held. See,
e.g., Henry Chu, Under EU, independence feels viable to EU's secessionists, L.A. TIMES, (Dec.
24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com2012/dec/24/world/la-fg-europe-separatism-20121219.
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pretentions to true independence, but also provides a larger framework of
cooperation in which small units can maintain the kind of qualified,
interdependent sovereignty that has always, in fact, constituted
statehood. If anything, the conditions of the contemporary world make
small states more, not less, viable.
In short, concerns about viability probably are greatly
exaggerated-and may indeed be principally a fiction predicated upon
the all-too-human tendency to overvalue present conditions and treat
them as necessary or normative. 3
Violence: But perhaps the real concern is with change itself, and
the risks of violence that change creates. We assume, in other words, that
a more flexible rule would promote great violence-really greater
violence, because there is a great deal of violence under the present rule,
so we should make a relative evaluation. Measurement is difficult and
the evidence complex: while the number of international conflicts has
declined since 1945, the number of internal conflicts has increased-and
indeed at all points in the postwar era, there have been many more
internal than international conflicts.34 It might be, in other words, that
even if the present rule has had an effect, it might not have reduced
violence so much as redirected it from cross-border conflicts to internal
conflicts. It is even possible-though just as hard to prove as the
prevailing assumption-that the current rule has increased violence, by
creating the conditions for groups locked inside the modern state to
engage in all-or-nothing struggles for the control of states from which
there is no effective exit.
3 Indeed, claims about viability of new units themselves exhibit assumptions about the feasibility
of development and sustainability within existing frontiers. See, e.g., Jeffrey Herbst, Is Nigeria a
Viable State?, 19 WASH. Q. 151, 151 (1996) ("The outstanding assumption about the developing
world since World War II has been that countries can develop within their existing
boundaries .... Yet the view that development can occur without changes in boundaries is
relatively recent. Before World War II, boundaries across the world changed with some
frequency and it was certainly not assumed that all countries, irrespective of their internal
capacities, would inevitably prosper.").
3' Lotta Themndr & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2013, 51 J. PEACE RES. 541, 544,
Fig. 1 (2014) (showing numbers of internal, international and other forms of conflict since 1946).
See also UPCD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, PRIO,
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdpprio armedconflict dataset/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2015) (noting that in 2013, there were 24 interstate conflicts, no interstate conflicts, and nine
internationalized intrastate conflicts). It can actually be quite complex to determine if a given
conflict ought to be considered international or internal. How is the Tern "'Armed Conflict"
Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Mar. 2008),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
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In addition, we must recall that, logically, violence is not only or
even typically caused by secession as such, but by resistance to
secession 35_a perspective that might alter one's normative evaluation,
even if empirical predictions about the violence accompanying the
formation of new states are accurate. Under the present rule, states have
no obligation to create peaceful pathways to secession, and public order
principles give them considerable leeway to use coercive measures and
actual violence to constrain calls for secession.36 It is quite plausible,
therefore, that separatist groups resorting to violence often do so either
because they have exhausted peaceful options or reasonably believe it
would be pointless, even dangerous, to seek secession through peaceful
means.
If the present rule actually ensured stability and reduced
violence, there might be little point in proposing a radical alternative. Yet
the evidence of the post-war period shows that, despite the near-total ban
on external self-determination, existing states do not feel sufficient
confidence in the current rule to relax about the minorities in their midst:
around the world regimes suppress minorities, evidently fearing the
claims they might make.37 So the present rule, despite handing so many
cards to states, has not handed them enough to quiet their fears and
ensure peace.
3 There are numerous examples of state formation and significant border correction that were not
accompanied by violence: the many peaceful decolonizations; several of the territorial plebiscites
after the First World War; the division of Czechoslovakia; as well as the failed efforts in Quebec
and Scotland. And while in some cases it may be that secessionists are the first to resort to
violence, logically those are cases in which the normal pathways for political change make
peaceful secession improbable. Yet the assumption that somehow secession itself is responsible
for violence seems deeply entrenched in political and scholarly thinking. See, e.g., MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 23 (2001) ("States in the age of human
rights have to reconcile human rights observance with containing a dissident or oppressed
opposition or an ethnic minority seeking self-determination. These secessionist challenges, often
backed up by terrorism, sometimes jeopardize the unity of the state .... ").
36 Violence And the Use of Force, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 6 (July 2011),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc 002 0943.pdf ("Maintaining law and order is the
responsibility of civil authorities ... armed forces may be required to come to the assistance of
civil authorities to deal with much lower levels of violence [than armed conflicts] that may be
characterized as internal disturbances and tensions."). Many states constitutionally prohibit their
territorial dismemberment, and some states criminalize the advocacy of secession. See, e.g.,
Damian Grammaticas, China Jails Prominent Uighur Academic Ilham Tohtifor Life, BBC (Sept.
23, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29321701.
3 Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay & Elliott Green, Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa,
26 ECON. ORG. AND PUB. POL'Y PROGRAMME (2008), available at
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/eopp/eopp26.pdf; DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN
CONFLICT (1985).
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But this is not because there are other cards to give; it is because
political, ethnic and regional groups persist in making claims even when
playing against a stacked deck. Even though the present rule almost
absolutely rejects involuntary separation of territory, states nonetheless
engage in suppressive behavior towards ethnic groups, which do often
pursue secessionist or autonomist claims despite only rarely prosecuting
those claims successfully.
What this shows us is that the current rule of territorial integrity
is not self-enforcing; the continuity of existing states' territory-even of
states' existence-is often accompanied by and accomplished with great
violence, even in the absence of any movement for secession. In
weighing the relative costs of different rules, we must weigh all the
sources of violence to arrive at a moral accounting. The current rule of
territorial integrity has not in fact created a peaceful world-and whether
it has produced a more peaceful world than any of the alternatives is
precisely the question we need to answer.
B. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT EFFECTS ON INTERNAL POLITICS
Lowered incentives to cooperate: The current rule assumes that
relaxing the rigid commitment to territorial integrity-relaxing the
"locked-in" quality of the modem state 3 --would lower the incentives of
non-majority communities to cooperate, as they would have an attractive
opt-out. This would lead to less effective processes for negotiating
governance in modem, diverse societies.39 Thus populations
entitled to self-determination will lean towards rigidity and
intransigence; convinced that the right to self-determination entitles
them to absolute independence, they will be reticent to negotiate if
sovereignty does not immediately appear in the offing. All too often,
invoking a legal right renders the right holder less flexible and
receptive to compromise.
40
38 See Yuval Shany, Redrawing Maps, Manipulating Demographics: On Exchange of Populated
Territories and Self-Determination, 2 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS 286, 297 (2008) ("It]he 'locking
in' of different groups within a single polity provides the State with relative permanence and
stability and conveys to the different ethnic groups within the State the idea that, from an
international perspective, they share a single national identity and, perhaps, a common destiny.").
39 ALAN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO
LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 100 (1991).
0 Cf. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 350 (speaking about minorities).
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In fact, this is probably true-the tendency for rights talk to
become rigid is often criticized 4 -- but not only for minorities. Whatever
its effects on the willingness of minorities to cooperate, a rigid rule of
territorial integrity clearly lowers incentives for majorities to cooperate
in governing their minorities.4 2 Under the current rule, majorities
effectively have an absolute right to preserve the existing state; they
don't need to give minorities almost anything. Locked borders and no
possibility of exit mean that, even in a democratic society, the majority
knows it need give only some minimum to the minority to avoid either
the extremely high and doctrinally controversial thresholds for remedial
secession claims, or the risk of radicalizing marginalized minorities. 3 So
majorities too will "lean towards rigidity and intransigence ... be
reticent to negotiate ... [and] less flexible and receptive to
compromise."' And, of course, they control the army.
Indeed, what the assumption about rigid politics hides from our
gaze is that the current rule creates and naturalizes an entire system of
rigidity, taking off the table a wide range of possible solutions to social
tensions arising out of the factual diversity of existing states. There is
simply no reason to believe that, on balance, the relationship between
majority and minority is made more moderate by locking the borders of
the state.
C. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE KINDS OF STATES PRODUCED
45
Illiberalism: One objection to a more flexible rule rests upon an
assumption about the kinds of states that would be likely to arise:
secession, it is thought, uniquely tends towards the production of illiberal
polities. Thus, rigid territorial rules act as a brake against illiberal
41 Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
(1993).
42 Cf Monica Duff3' Toft, Indivisible Territory and Ethnic War, 12 SEC. STUD. 82 (2002);
IGNATIEFF, supra note 35, at 22 ("Even when secessionist challenges are not explicit, repressive
regimes raise the specter of their threat to justify authoritarian rule.").
43 Basic game theory suggests that when one side controls the distribution of a good and the other
side has no option to exit the game, distributive outcomes will strongly favor the dominant side.
See Bargaining with Outside Options, GAME THEORY 101,
http://gametheoryl01.com/Outside Options.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
4 CASSESE, supra note 8, at 350.
' These are closely linked to the first two categories: As debates such as the democratic peace
thesis suggest, levels of violence and regime type can be related, and the assumptions about the
effects on internal politics inform assumptions about what would result after secession.
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tendencies by locking unreliable communities into larger and more
liberal units.
Obviously a preference for liberal states is normative, but there
is an empirical question embedded here as well: When secessions do
occur, are they in fact illiberal? Do seceding states tend to be less liberal
than their predecessors? There is actually no evidence of this-the few
non-colonial cases we have are plausibly seen as efforts by a relatively
more liberal community to escape a repressive state, as with the Baltics
from the Soviet Union or Slovenia from late, Serbian-dominated
Yugoslavia.46 And of course it is quite difficult to assign a clear empirical
value to the "before" and "after" conditions of liberated colonies: even
though in many of them conditions quite clearly got far worse after
independence, the bare fact of colonialism-the condition of not
governing oneself-seems an example of illiberalism non pareil.
Logically, the only valence secessions necessarily have is
towards smaller units-and perhaps, one might add, towards a world
view in which integration and "ever greater union" are not reflexively
predominant values. But that is not the same thing as an illiberal (or more
illiberal) orientation; after all, the greater unions called imperialism were
not obviously more liberal. Of course, there is no reason to believe
secessions are necessarily more liberal either. The objection really rests
on an unfounded assumption that larger or pre-existing political units
necessarily exhibit greater liberality-a proposition that many residents
of the former Soviet Union, or Russia today, or China would find
dubious, even if they are lucky enough to be ethnic Russian or Han.
But it is also objected that secessions, because they are
principally undertaken by ethno-national groups, tend to produce
nationalist-oriented states, which are either definitionally illiberal (on
modem understandings of the term)47 or simply undesirable." Here too,
46 Chris Behan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Western Countries Eyeing More Western
Integration, in ARMS ON THE MARKET: REDUCING THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION IN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION 150 (Gary K. Bertsch & Suzette R. Grillot, eds., 1998); Paul Shoup, Titoism and
the National Question: A Reassessment, in THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA, YEARBOOK
OF EUROPEAN STUDIES 5, 64 (Martin van den Heuvel & Jan G. Siccama, eds., 1992).
47 In the 19th century, there would not have been any perceived incompatibility between liberalism
and nationalism.
4 Cf Joseph Weiler, Catalonia's Independence and the European Union, EJIL TALK! (Dec. 20,
2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonian-independence-and-the-european-union/ (referring to a
"frenzy for secession and independence[;]" and associating Catalan independence with the
"mindset" of the "poisonous logic of national purity and ethnic cleansing[;]" and calling
secession "irredentist Euro-tribalism which contradicts the deep values and needs of the
Union.").
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however, we find the empirical and normative problematically mixed. It
is true that, outside the colonial context, secessions have tended to
produce more ethnically homogenous units,49 but this is not the same
thing as a nationalist orientation of the state and society as such-it is
simply a description of demography, of the qualities shared by a
population within, indeed defined by, a given territory.
To describe such bounded demography as undesirable is, of
course, purely a normative choice. One might agree or disagree, but in so
doing one would have to account for the fact that many states in the
existing order that were not formed by secession also exhibit high levels
of ethnic homogeneity: the states of northern Europe, for example,
despite decades of liberal immigration policies, remain highly
homogenous compared with most African states. ° And, of course, when
those European states first embarked on policies friendly to immigration,
they were even more homogenous-a good reminder that there may be
no necessary relationship between the incidental demography of a given
territory and the liberality of the policies that territory's population and
state might support. Or, indeed, if there is a relationship, it probably runs
in the other direction: homogeneity may, ceteris paribus, more likely
correlate with decency and lack of conflict.5
This raises a related question: Are the states we have in fact the
best units? All states are diverse, and are so in their own particular ways.
Those differences create challenges of internal coordination--diversity is
partly a descriptive fact, partly a value, but not a formula for ease of
governance. So the demographic qualities of a state are relevant to its
prospects for effective internal governance, for civil discourse-some
combinations will find Habermas and Rawls easier to apply than
49 This is not to suggest that new states formed by secession are not heterogeneous. But, as cases
such as Yugoslavia, Ireland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and India and Pakistan
demonstrate, division of a state will often lead to the creation of new states, each of which has a
relatively more homogenous population than did the predecessor state. When a secession occurs
along ethnic lines, this proposition is almost axiomatic.
so Cf Max Fisher, A Revealing Map of the World's Most and Least Ethnically Diverse Countries,
WASH. POST (May 16, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/20l 3/05/16/a-revealing-map-of-the-
worlds-most-and-least-ethnically-diverse-countries/ (showing the greatest preponderance of
ethnically homogenous countries in Europe and highest heterogeneity in sub-Saharan Africa,
though also showing high homogeneity in Russia, China, and Egypt, among others).
51 Id.; See also Alberto F. Alesina et al., Fractionalization, (Harvard Inst. Research Working Paper
No. 1959, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-319762.
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others-and even for the likelihood of violent conflict. 2 And since we
know human identities are fluid and demographics are changeable, why
would we assume that rigid political units are the proper medium to
contain those identities? Yet that is precisely the assumption that the
current model makes.
D. A FOURTH ASSUMPTION-THAT THIS IS THE BEST POSSIBLE RULE
Finally, we might also consider an assumption implicit in the
point just raised above: namely that the states we happen to have are
satisfactory because the limited avenues afforded by the current rule for
creating new states are in fact sufficient-that we already have the right
rule. After all, since the end of the Cold War, a large number of states
have come into existence outside the decolonization process. Moreover,
some recent developments-moves towards internal democracy53 and
remedial secession,54 for example-are expressly intended to ameliorate
the harsher effects of rigid borders. Secessions do occasionally occur, so
perhaps the system is already responsive enough?
I think the answer is no. First, the secessions that do occur have
generally come after great violence and long delays-think of Kosovo,
South Sudan, or East Timor. Second, the favored tools of international
law are self-limiting: human rights approaches, for example, are not only
often ineffective, but reactive, designed to respond to a logic of violation
that creates perverse incentives for secessionist groups to demonstrate
they have suffered enough to deserve protection. Indeed the whole
project of remedial secession is fatally self-limiting in this way-guided
by a harm threshold logic that contemplates secession only as a last
resort in the most extreme situations. By design, remedial and
ameliorative approaches are not responsive to the idea of secession as a
right or claim.5
52 All these points, apart from the link to Habermas and Rawls (and even that is implicit), are raised
in id. I have not found data about the relationship of state size to violence, but obviously any
normative design that would make it easier to create more, smaller states must be interested in
this question-as would any objection to that design.
53 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992).
54 See Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack oJ) Practice, 6 ST.
ANTONY'S INT'L REV. 37 (2010).
55 This does not mean we should give up on human rights-they are a project of inherent value, and
can practically improve the lives of people in real ways-but we should not assume that they will
provide sufficient aid to groups that desire to alter their states. Rights operate within the context
Wisconsin International Law Journal
The most promising line of development, the move towards
internal democracy, can prove deeply destabilizing, especially in
multiethnic states. Elections are easy to organize, but a democratic
culture takes time to develop. That lag can be dangerous, encouraging a
contest for all-or-nothing control of a state from which there is no exit
and in which elections are simply a means to vindicate demographic
dominance.56
Perhaps we should note one more feature-a fact accessible to us
despite the untestable nature of global norms: the current rule evidently
leaves many people living under the domination of some state other than
one they might prefer. We know this, since they frequently try to form
new states and often are killed in the process. Surely this is not the best
of all possible rules.
IV. CONSTRUCTING AN UNSATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVE TO AN
IMPOSSIBLE TEST
All of these are merely indirect indications-intuitions-that we
might have reason to question the easy assumptions surrounding our
territorial norm; they are not tests in their own right. If we find the rule
both intuitively unsatisfying and annoyingly untestable, we should
consider how we might nonetheless take its measure.
One way, of course, would be to do what was not effectively
done in 1945; to make a discrete change in the rule without altering other
parts of the system, and then examine the effects longitudinally. Is the
future more or less violent, more or less stable? Are there more or fewer
people living in societies constructed on lines they themselves prefer?
Obviously this is politically impractical, as is the alternative of
subjecting, say, only one hemisphere to a different rule.
Instead, we might try a kind of thought experiment; elaborating
the contours of a discretely different rule, and modeling the plausible
outcomes, perhaps through game theory models, perhaps through large-
scale role-playing exercises. An entirely unsatisfactory method, to be
sure, but considering the alternative, perhaps the best we might do. That
is the larger project in which I am presently engaged. There might be
of existing states, ameliorating harm within them; they are not adequate tools to counteract the
considerable problems created by a system of rigid borders.
56 See generally JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND
NATIONALIST CONFLICT (2000); PAUL COLLIER, WARS, GUNS AND VOTES: DEMOCRACY IN
DANGEROUS PLACES (2009).
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many alternative models-in fact, the whole point of the exercise
requires one to try out a variety, to see what different effects they might
have. In cursory form, here is the one I am currently developing:
Alternative Rule 1.0-A Right of Secession
1. The existing protections for states' territorial integrity are
maintained, with one change: the assumption of territorial
integrity can be defeated by internal claims by a self-defined
community constituting a local territorial majority in part of one
state.
2. Such communities vindicate their claims exclusively through a
series of internationally monitored or supervised plebiscites,
which give rise to a process of negotiations.
a. The self-defining community itself determines the plebiscitary
territory, subject only to these limits:
i. some minimum population,
ii. some minimum contiguity of the territory, and
iii. no plebiscitary territory may cross an existing international
frontier.
b. Other communities within the territory can make counter-
claims, in a cascading plebiscite process.
3. To claim for a new state, a community must win a clear majority
or super-majority among all those living in, or having long-
standing ties to, the plebiscitary territory.
a. Historical claims are given no or almost no weight.
4. In addition to winning its plebiscite, a secessionist community
must:
a. accept all residents of the territory or others with legitimate ties
to it as full citizens of the new state,
b. undertake to respect all relevant human rights provisions, and
c. subject itself to ongoing international supervision.
5. The mother state would be under an obligation to:
a. allow and facilitate the plebiscite, and
b. in the event the plebiscite succeeds, to negotiate in good faith
the seceding community's departure.
6. The right is iterative with respect to any territory or population.
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7. All other commitments within the international state system
(human rights, non-aggression, succession rules, etc.) are
unaffected.
There are many factors to consider, but let me note its major
feature. Under this rule, territorial integrity would hold just as it does
today, especially against cross-border aggression, with one key
exception: for internal, democratic claims made by local territorial
majorities. As much as possible, other elements of the present global
system are held constant. Thus it is a single, small change, leaving the
basic framework of the state system in place-in many respects this a
very conservative proposal-but of course it is also a radical shift, and,
perhaps, a break from the logic that has governed that whole system for
the better part of a century.
There are plenty of potential benefits to this rule, and plenty of
objections, but for now I will leave those to the reader to consider. In a
sense, working out what they are is the point: deciding why this
alternative might or might not work better, or identifying yet another,
superior alternative, requires us to articulate and then interrogate-if
possible, even test-the assumptions underpinning our current rule. The
same is true for defending the existing model: saying this or any given
alternative is inferior, and explaining why, requires a rigorous analysis of
what the model might do, measured against what we know about the
current rule, or at least about the world in which the current rule exists.
But here I would like to note just one objection, which is the
charge that this whole proposal is an exercise in impractical idealism. In
a way, it's a fair cop-after all, if actually changing the rule is
impractical, as I acknowledge, then what's the point of engaging in a
fantasy project proposing to do exactly that? I don't have a good answer,
except to say that one has to start somewhere. And perhaps this: that
there is another impossibly unrealistic project, which is the belief that
borders can and should last forever; that whatever problems arise,
however unimaginable the community and however difficult its disputes,
it is always better to lock people in, and expect, with glowing, fervent
belief in our higher humanity, that it will all work out. Which is to say, to
believe in our present, untested rule.
